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Abstract
The most common pecuniary sanction, i.e. fixed-fines, places an emphasis on the 
severity of the crime. This fine has the problem of being either too high for poorer 
offenders to pay or too low for the richer offenders to be deterred. Day-fines, on 
the other hand, systematically account for the financial situation of the offender 
as well as for the severity of his offense. Consequently, it imposes equivalent bur-
den of punishment on offenders who committed similar crimes, regardless of their 
wealth. However, a problem of asymmetric information is raised. Accurate financial 
information is essential for the efficiency of day-fines, yet its collection is costly. 
Day-fines receive increasing attention from policy-makers around the world. None-
theless, it is under-researched in the law and economics literature. Therefore, this 
article is the first to formally analyze the problem of asymmetric information in the 
context of day-fines and to develop an optimal secondary enforcement system that 
would incentivize criminals to provide accurate information regarding their wealth.
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1 Introduction
It might be said that rich people can put a price on offenses. Most jurisdictions prac-
tice a fixed fine1 as a pecuniary sanction. Therefore, the wealthier is the person, the 
more attractive it is for him to ‘purchase the pleasure’ of violation. However, the 
result may be different in a system of price discrimination such as day-fines. Under 
this structure not only the severity of the offense is considered, but also the financial 
ability of the violator to pay. As a result, the attractiveness of committing an offense 
is the same for all potential violators.
Although day-fines have the potential to overcome the problems of a fixed-fine, 
there are factors, which impede its efficient implementation. One such factor is the 
asymmetric information problem. Data on the financial state of the offender is an 
essential element for setting the correct fine. Yet, it is private information of the 
criminal and collection of it by the authorities is costly. Under these circumstances, 
courts are driven to rely on the declaration of the offender regarding his financial 
capacity. This article formally demonstrates that due to the fact that increased wealth 
leads to a higher fine, culprits are always incentivized to underreport their wealth.
In order to increase the flow of correct information between the offender and 
the enforcement authorities, this article offers to introduce an optimal ‘secondary 
day-fine’. Under this system, prior to sentencing a convicted person to a day-fine for 
the primary offense, he is required to declare his wealth. With some probability his 
financial state can be audited. In case he is caught misreporting, the court should 
impose on him a secondary day-fine in addition to the primary fine. The size of 
the secondary day-fine depends on several elements: (1) the wealth of the offender 
(the daily unit), (2) the magnitude of one’s misreporting,2 and (3) the severity of 
the primary fine. The wealth-dependency reassures deterrence regardless of the 
offender’s financial state. The magnitude of misreporting achieves marginal deter-
rence3 in addition to the general deterrence. Namely, if not entirely deterring misre-
porting, the secondary day-fine may at least minimize the gap between the true and 
the reported wealth. Finally, the third element reassures that offenders are deterred 
regardless of the severity of the primary fine. Consequently, the ‘secondary enforce-
ment’ is a fine-discrimination system that may perfectly tailor the punishment to the 
specific offender, thus increasing the deterrence of underreporting one’s wealth.
The topic of day-fines is under-researched in the law and economics litera-
ture. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one relevant article that models 
wealth-dependent fines (Bar Niv and Safra 2002), and another article that analyzes 
the advantages of day-fines as compared to other models of fine (Kantorowicz-
Reznichenko 2015). Therefore, the current article is the first to address the asym-
metric information problem arising in the context of day-fines, to formally analyze 
1 A “fixed fine” is based on the severity of the crime and the blameworthiness of the offender. It does not 
systematically consider the socio-economic status of the person.
2 Magnitude of misreporting refers to the ratio between the reported wealth and the true wealth. In other 
words, it depicts the percentage of the wealth that the offender concealed.
3 The idea of proportional punishment and marginal deterrence is not novel. It was already introduced 
by Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth century. However, the term “marginal deterrence” was coined and 
formally depicted only in a later stage (Stigler 1970; Shavell 1992).
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the inefficiencies resulting from it, and to offer a possible solution. It is an important 
step since the information problem constitutes the reason not to introduce day-fines 
in certain countries, despite its potential efficiency.
The idea of auditing offenders who received a fine was previously discussed by 
Polinsky (2006). Nevertheless, his analysis concerns only fixed-fines where the 
financial information is important ex-post for the enforcement rather than ex-ante 
for a correct determination of the fine. Furthermore, the model offered by Polinsky 
significantly differs from the analyzed solution in the current article.4
The novelty of the suggested secondary enforcement system is in its structure. It 
suggests a pecuniary penalty for misreporting that takes several factors into account, 
thus enabling to tailor the fine to the specific offender. ‘Fine-discrimination’ sys-
tem may better deter criminals by raising the costs of misreporting above the private 
utility gains of each offender. Therefore, the current article offers a policy-relevant 
solution for increasing the effectiveness of a day-fine system. A wealth-dependent 
fine might constitute a credible alternative sanction to some imprisonment sen-
tences, thus, increasing its effectiveness has a potential to reduce the high costs of 
imprisonment. This is especially relevant in the American context where the prison 
population is the highest in the Western society (Neal and Rick 2016),5 and fines are 
largely underused (Whitman 2009).
The model presented in this article provides a formal way to calculate the optimal 
relationship between the severity of the primary fine and the severity of the second-
ary fine, a component that is termed in this article ‘the severity factor’. Based on 
the trade-off between the costs of auditing and the costs of a severer secondary fine, 
a socially optimal severity factor may be determined and set in the criminal code. 
Subsequently, the courts may use this severity factor to calculate the optimal sec-
ondary fine in each individual case.
The article is structured as follows. Section  2 briefly describes what day-fines 
are and why they may be more efficient in deterring potential offenders than fixed-
fines. However, this article treats day-fines as a given system and focuses on the 
question how to increase its efficiency.6 The asymmetric information problem is 
presented in Sect. 3. In addition, this section demonstrates that with self-reporting 
system rational offenders would always misreport. Section 4 presents the secondary 
enforcement system. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided in Sect. 5.
4 The main conclusion of Polinsky’s model is that (fixed) fines should be lowered in order to induce 
more offenders to report their income truthfully, and in turn, reduce the auditing costs.
5 For a comparison of the prison population in different countries, see the International Centre for Prison 
Studies, available at http://www.priso nstud ies.org/world -priso n-brief (accessed August 3, 2016).
6 For a comparison of different models of fine and the arguments in favor of day-fine see Kantorowicz-
Reznichenko (2018).
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2  Day‑fines
2.1  What are day‑fines?
A day-fine is a monetary sanction that systematically takes into consideration 
offender’s socio-economic status. Thus, the amount of the fine depends on the grav-
ity of the crime and the financial state of the offender. The day-fine is imposed in two 
steps. First, based on the gravity of the crime, the court decides on the number of 
days the offender must pay the fine. In the second stage, after assessing the financial 
capacity of the culprit, the court imposes the daily unit of the fine. This unit is usu-
ally a fraction of the offender’s daily income and, in some systems, is pre-set in the 
law. The total fine, which needs to be paid by the offender, is the multiplication of 
the number of days by the daily unit. For instance, a particular offender earns $100 
per day. The daily unit in a certain jurisdiction is 50% of the daily income. If based 
on the severity of his offense the judge imposes 10 days of fine, the total fine to be 
paid by the convicted offender is 100 × 0.5 × 10 = $500. On the other hand, if the 
offender’s daily income is $20, he would pay for the same crime 20 × 0.5 × 10 = $100 
Therefore, this type of pecuniary sanction results in an equal relative burden on 
offenders regardless of their wealth.
A wealth-dependent fine was already suggested in the  19th century by Jeremy 
Bentham (1931). However, such a fine was adopted in practice only at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. Finland was the first country to introduce day-fines in 1921 
and later on it was followed by other European countries7 (for a survey see, Kantoro-
wicz-Reznichenko 2018). At the same period, several South-American countries8 
also applied this model of fine (Hillsman 1990). In the Unites States, some counties 
experimented with this punishment during the 1980s–1990s and received positive 
results regarding the compliance of offenders sentenced to this type of fine (U.S. 
Department of Justice 1996).
Although the idea behind this fine is similar across jurisdictions, there are dif-
ferent structures of this sanction. For instance, the Finish Criminal Code instructs 
the court to impose a fine unit equal to approximately 50% of the offender’s daily 
income (§ 2(2), Chapter 2a; Lappi-Seppälä 2009). It restricts the number of days to 
120 for one offense, and 240 for two offense (§ 1(1), Chapter 2a; § 3(2), Chapter 7). 
There is no statutory maximal cap on the daily amount of the fine. As a result, the 
fine might be very high. For instance, in 1999 a €116,000 (around $130,000) fine 
was imposed on a wealthy driver who exceeded the permitted speed limit in Finland. 
The yearly income of this driver was assessed in millions, thus the daily unit was 
magnified.9 Germany, on the other hand, limits the maximum amount of the daily 
unit to 30,000 euro. Furthermore, the court may impose up to 360 days of fine (§ 40 
of the German Criminal Code). Due to its special structure, day-fines may be used 
7 For instance, Sweden (1931), Denmark (1933), Germany (1975), Poland (1997).
8 Peru (1924), Brazil (1969), Costa Rica (1972), Bolivia (1972). Also Cuba introduced day fine in 1936.
9 See “Nokia Boss Gets Record Speeding Fine,” BBC News (January 14, 2002) available at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europ e/17597 91.stm (accessed April 17, 2016).
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extensively as a criminal sanction. To illustrate, in 2012, around 82% of all imposed 
sanctions by the German courts were fines (German Statistics Office 2012). Moreo-
ver, this sanction was not merely used to punish minor offenses, but was imposed on 
offenders committing crimes such as an assault, property crimes, drug offenses, etc. 
(Albrecht 1991).
2.2  Wealth‑dependent fine
Fixed-fines are the most common form of pecuniary sanctions. These fines depend 
on the severity of the offense and the blameworthiness of the offender without sys-
tematically taking the offender’s wealth into account. A fixed fine has a significant 
shortcoming. It under-deters wealthy offenders if there is heterogeneity in the wealth 
levels of potential culprits. To formally reconstruct this argument assume that the 
offender has the following utility function:
In this function H is the utility that the offender receives from committing the 
crime and v(w) is the utility he receives from his wealth. Every potential offender 
has his initial wealth and the utility he derives from it. The additional utility from 
crime is the incentive underlying the choice to commit a crime. Including the sum of 
these components in the utility function helps to analyze the incentives of the poten-
tial offender to commit a crime. It also allows for the analysis of enforcement tools 
which can deter crime. Moreover, it is assumed that the marginal utility from wealth 
is always positive dv
dw
> 0 but diminishing d2v
d2w
< 0 since presumably each additional 
unit of wealth satisfies a less crucial need.10 Committing the offense will increase 
the offender’s utility by H but with probability p he will be convicted for the offense 
and a fine f would be imposed on him. Accordingly, an offender commits offenses if 
the expected utility from this action is higher than the utility he receives only from 
his initial wealth (without committing the offense):
Given this condition an offender will be deterred from committing the crime if 
the imminent utility loss through the fine (expected costs of crime) is larger than the 
utility he gains from committing the crime:
(1)U(H,w) = H + v(w)
(2)H + p × v(w − f ) + (1 − p) × v(w) > v(w)
(3)
H
p
≤ v(w) − v(w − f )
10 This implies risk averse individuals. The common assumption is that most people are risk averse. 
Even though some offenders can be risk seeking, given the nature of offences that are punishable by 
day fines (minor offences, see Kantorowicz-Reznichenko and Faure forthcoming), it seems reasonable 
to assume those offenders are more similar to the general population than to the most extreme examples 
of offenders. Some support for this assumption can be found in a study which investigated the behaviour 
of traffic rules violators and found that wealthier people respond less to increases in fines (Bar-Ilan and 
Sacerdote 2004).
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This resembles the classical deterrence model offered by Becker (1968). Accord-
ing to this model, crime goes down if the probability of conviction or the fine is 
increased. On the other hand, crime goes up, if the utility from committing the 
crime rises. The enforcement authorities are able to change the expected costs of 
crime by altering the severity of punishment or the probability of being detected and 
punished.11
However, the decision whether to commit the crime is sensitive to the wealth of 
the offender (Bar Niv and Safra 2002). To analyze this assume that the enforcement 
authorities set the probability and the level of fine such that the median offender wm 
is optimally deterred.
Further assume that there exists a wealthy offender that is richer than the median 
offender ww > wm . If the fine is non-zero and given the positive marginal utility 
assumption, his expected utility loss from committing the offense is lower than the 
expected loss of the median offender.
Therefore, the condition for not committing an offense does not hold for the 
wealthy offender and hence he will not be sufficiently deterred. Accordingly, it can 
be concluded that a wealth-dependent fine is socially more desirable if there exists 
heterogeneity in the wealth levels of potential offenders. However, a question arises 
how to implement such a policy efficiently.
2.3  Day‑fines as wealth‑dependent fines
A day-fine is an example of a wealth-dependent fine. As explained in Sect. 2.1, it 
consists of two components in order to calibrate the fine for the gravity of the crime 
and the offender’s wealth.
where n(s) is the number of days that depends on the severity of the crime, and d 
is the daily unit that depends on the offender’s wealth. The number of the imposed 
days of a fine remains the same for all offenders committing similar crimes. This 
article concentrates on a generic initial offense and hence the gravity of the primary 
offense, and accordingly the number of days, is held constant.12 Therefore, the pri-
mary fine in the current analysis is only a function of wealth ( f (w)).
(4)
H
p
= v
(
wm
)
− v
(
wm − f
)
.
(5)v
(
ww
)
− v
(
ww − f
)
< v
(
wm
)
− v
(
wm − f
)
(6)f (s,w) = n(s) × d(w)
12 This article focuses on the information asymmetry problem around the offender’s wealth, which is 
introduced in Sect. 3.2. Since the analysis of this is independent of the severity of the initial offense, it is 
held constant for simplicity.
11 Another way to reduce crime is by increasing the attractiveness of legal opportunities (Becker 1968).
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3  Setting an efficient day‑fine
Given the findings of the previous section, a wealth-dependent fine function f (w) 
and df
dw
> 0 , such that H
p
= v(w) − v(w − f (w)) holds, leads to a sanctioning regime 
that perfectly deters offenders, regardless of their wealth. However, this result relies 
on the assumption that the sentencing authority has accurate information about the 
offender’s wealth. Intuitively speaking, the key element in the sanction of day-fines 
is accurate information regarding the financial state of the offender. To achieve the 
desired deterrence through the usage of this penalty there should be an appropriate 
tailoring of the sentence to the crime and the offender. Nevertheless, whereas the 
gravity of the offense is usually observable, the financial state of the offender is pri-
vate information. Therefore, the sentencing authority has to rely on a weak signal of 
the offender’s wealth. The following sections examine the problems of limited finan-
cial information and its implications on deterrence.
3.1  Asymmetric information and the information costs
As in the classical contexts such as consumption (Akerlof 1970), employment 
(Spence 1973) and insurance (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976), where asymmet-
ric information between the parties has an effect on transactions, also the system 
of day fines raises the problem of asymmetric information. Whereas the delinquent 
possesses full knowledge regarding his income and assets, the authorities may not 
obtain this information without costs. However, this information is essential for the 
decision regarding the daily unit of the fine. Without this information, the decision 
regarding the magnitude of the fine may be based solely on the severity of the crime, 
and in this case equal the fixed-fine.
Some of the criminal codes in the countries practicing day-fines include the 
sources of information that may be used by the courts to assess the financial state 
of the offender. For instance, in Finland the courts ought to use the most recent tax 
report (§2(3), Chapter 2a, The Criminal Code of Finland). In Switzerland and Den-
mark, the penal code provides a general obligation for relevant authorities to make 
available the necessary information for the courts (Article 34(3), The Swiss Crimi-
nal Code; § 51(4), The Penal Code of Denmark).
Whatever the case may be it seems that the costs of gathering this information 
are non-negligible. In order to properly obtain the needed elements for the daily unit 
of fine, the courts (or other authorities) need to collect information on the income 
of the offender, his assets, savings, and expenses that might be deducted from the 
daily unit. Those are different elements of the criminal’s financial state and usually 
require the assistance of variety of authorities. Thus, the collection of this informa-
tion regarding a high number of convicted persons is a time consuming and costly 
endeavor. As stated by two commentators in the American context: “nothing is 
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“simple” in assessing an individual’s “ability to pay.” Relying on legislative, judi-
cial, or administrative efforts to determine an individual’s financial status or capac-
ity is fraught with complications. To gain an accurate picture of the income posi-
tion of an individual, whose work record is irregular at best, is constantly changing, 
and has financial obligations that might extend across multiple institutional arenas 
(child support, restitution, court, and state obligations in addition to informal or 
formal loans taken from family and friends) only can be beset by inaccuracies.” 
(Katzenstein and Nagrech 2011, p. 564).
This problem was explicitly raised in different countries. For instance, in the Span-
ish criminal justice system day-fines were welcomed, yet perceived as inefficiently 
used. There was a sense that the investigation of the financial capacity of the offender 
becomes more costly than the investigation of the crime itself. As a result, courts used 
intuition to set the daily unit of fine, which led to fines closer to the minimum bound-
ary (Bachmaier and del Moral García 2010). Moreover, the Netherlands has discussed 
the possibility to adopt the day-fine system, yet rejected this proposal partially due to 
high expected costs of identifying and gathering the necessary information. One of 
the main arguments was that this system is too complicated. Calculating the financial 
capacity of offenders would turn the enforcement authorities to tax services and draw 
the attention from examining the relevant factors to the crime (Simonis 2001).
Consequently, authorities might view it more efficient to transfer the information 
costs to the offender, who is the ‘cheapest’ information provider. One example is 
Germany, which uses day-fines as the main sanction. Due to the substantial number 
of criminals who need to be processed by the criminal justice system, the offend-
ers’ financial information, which is provided by the police and the public prosecu-
tor, is limited. Most frequently, the information regarding the offender’s personal 
and socio-economic circumstances is gathered through a questionnaire filled by the 
delinquent himself. As a result, the offender is the primary source of information 
regarding his income. Since this is the most vital information for the second step of 
day-fines, German judges developed relatively uniform estimation of income based 
on the profession of the offender (Albrecht 1991). The reliance on the offender as 
the source of information regarding his financial state is not practiced only in Ger-
many, but in other jurisdictions as well (Hillsman 1990).
Nevertheless, the usage of an average estimation of income for all offenders in the 
same profession impedes the advantage of day-fines, i.e. tailoring the fine exactly 
to the offender and the offense. Not all people in the same profession earn an equal 
income. The earnings of a person may increase or decrease depending on different 
factors, e.g. extra working hours, excessive illness days. It is safe to assume that in 
the case where the offender earns less than the average income in his profession, he 
would invest in convincing the court to reduce his fine. However, by the same token 
it is expected that rational offenders would not correct the court if their true income 
were higher than the average in their profession. In these circumstances there is 
under-deterrence of offenders who have higher than the average income.
Another striking example for the information problem with respect to day-fines 
can be found in Sweden. This country has one of the most extensive accesses to 
individual financial information. In fact, individual tax returns are available online 
(The Economist 2016). In theory, this should allow courts to gather this information 
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and set the most accurate daily unit (Thornstedt 1975). Nevertheless, in practice it 
is not done (Greene 1992), and a possible explanation might be the high costs of 
gathering information on each offender that is subject to a day-fine. The Swedish 
prosecutorial guidelines state explicitly that the main source of information should 
be the offender. An investigation of the truthfulness of the provided information 
ought to be conducted only in case there is a suspicion that the information is wrong 
or incomplete to the extent it can affect the daily unit (Section 1.2 of the Prosecu-
tor General’s Guidelines 2007). Recently, a motion was filed to the Swedish parlia-
ment requesting to abolish day-fines altogether. One of the main justifications for the 
motion was a concern that the financial information of the offender is rarely veri-
fied. Therefore, it is expected that many offenders underreport and the punishment is 
under-deterring (Boriana Aberg, Motion to the Swedish Parliament 2014).
3.2  Incentives to misreport
Day-fines aim at individualizing the criminal sentencing with respect to wealth. 
This kind of a system allows imposing on the offender the appropriate burden of 
fine, which would constitute sufficient expected costs of crime, yet at the same time 
enable the offender to ‘serve’ his punishment. To set the appropriate fine there is a 
need to be informed of the actual wealth of the offender. Since the costs of gathering 
information are high, as described in the previous section, the courts might want to 
rely on the offender’s declaration of income. Nonetheless, in the absence of expected 
costs for misrepresenting, based on the deterrence theory, rational offenders would 
always underreport their wealth. Forasmuch as the severity of a fine is positively 
correlated with the person’s wealth, there is a strong incentive to report an income 
below the true earnings of the offender.
In other words, the offender has no incentive to report his true wealth. For illustra-
tion, take the utility function of the offender, and assume that he has been convicted 
for the primary crime. The fine for the offense for which he was convicted depends on 
the wealth he reports w̃ . Therefore, the offender faces the following decision problem:
If there are no constrains imposed on his decision and given that the fine increases 
with wealth, the offender chooses to report zero wealth (w̃ = 0) in order to maximize 
his utility.13 This means that the offender receives a fine that is lower than the one 
he would receive if he would report truthfully. Consequently, the expected costs of 
committing an offense are lower as well. Taking this result and plugging it into the 
offender’s initial choice problem—whether to commit an offense or not—confirms 
the intuition that unconstrained self-reporting impedes deterrence.
(7)maxw̃ (H + v(w − f (w̃))
(8)
H
p
= v(w) − v(w − f (w)) > v(w) − v(w − f (w̃ = 0))
13 One obvious constrain is of course, not reporting a negative income.
348 European Journal of Law and Economics (2020) 49:339–360
1 3
This impediment to deterrence arises since the expected costs of committing an 
offense are too low and hence the ‘no-offense’ condition does not hold. Some anec-
dotal evidence for such behavior can be found in the American experiments with 
day-fines (Vera Institute of Justice 1995). Consequently, the self-reporting of wealth 
requires an appropriate constraining mechanism in order to ensure the effective 
deterrence of the primary fine regime.
3.3  Self‑reported financial information in the tax‑collection system
Reliance on self-reported wealth may be found in the context of tax enforcement.14 
Since annually auditing the entire working population is costly, many countries 
adopt the model of tax reporting. Under this system individuals are required to 
report to the tax authorities the sources of their income and their amounts.15 In order 
to induce compliance with this requirement, those systems introduced costs for mis-
reporting. Namely, with certain probability individuals may be audited, and if found 
underreporting, might be punished.
In the U.S., for instance, the main source of financial information on which the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) relies is the self-assessments of individuals’ income. 
This procedure is named ‘voluntary compliance’. If individuals (or corporations) 
decide to misreport their wealth in order to evade paying taxes, they might be sub-
ject to civil audit or criminal investigation. In case they are caught, a sentence may 
be imposed on them, including the severe punishment of imprisonment. Further-
more, in order to increase the deterrent effect of this system, information regarding 
convictions is publicized.16
The choice whether to misreport income for the purpose of tax evasion was mod-
elled in the framework of economics of crime already in the 1970s (Allingham and 
Sandmo 1972). In the simplified model the individual has a choice whether to report 
his income correctly or to misreport it. With certain probability the individual will 
be audited, and if caught misreporting, would be required to pay a tax on the con-
cealed income and an additional penalty for misreporting. This model demonstrates, 
among others, that increasing the sanction or the probability for misreporting one’s 
wealth will result in the increase of the reported wealth.
The systems of tax collection and setting an efficient day-fine have similar charac-
teristics in some respects. Under both systems, the amount an individual is required 
to pay positively correlates with his income. Consequently, there are similar incen-
tives to underreport the wealth. Therefore, some lesson may be learned from the 
structure of the tax enforcement system. The remaining of this article develops a 
model of the secondary enforcement system that introduces incentives for true 
reporting of wealth.
14 For an analysis of methods to induce self-reporting of general criminal behavior see, Innes (2000).
15 For instance, this is practiced in the U.S., The Netherlands.
16 Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation (CI) At-a-Glance (2014), available at http://www.
irs.gov/uac/Crimi nal-Inves tigat ion-(CI)-At-a-Glanc e (accessed January 15, 2016).
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4  Possible solution: the “secondary enforcement system”
As demonstrated in the previous sections, complete information regarding the 
wealth of the offender is the key element to the imposition of an efficient day-fine. 
Yet, collecting this information can be a costly task for the law enforcement authori-
ties. Conversely, an offender’s costs of providing information about his wealth may 
be assumed to be very low, given that this is his private information. Thus, transfer-
ring these costs to the convicted culprit rather than imposing them on the state is a 
cost-effective policy. Nevertheless, the offender needs to be adequately incentivized 
to provide his private information. One method to set such incentives, as done also 
in the context of tax enforcement, is to introduce (expected) costs of misreporting. 
These costs may be introduced through the criminal punishment of misreporting. To 
this end, the current article proposes to establish a “secondary enforcement system” 
which imposes an independent day-fine for misreporting the financial information.
4.1  The secondary sanction
The suggested secondary enforcement system becomes relevant after the offender 
is convicted for the primary offense. At this point the sentencing authority requires 
the offender to provide precise information about his wealth in order to determine 
the amount of the primary fine f1(w̃) . To incentivize the offender not to misreport, 
the criminal justice system treats misreporting as a secondary offense that is punish-
able by an additional fine. In order to identify misreporting, the offender’s wealth is 
audited with the probability 0 < p2 < 1 and if misreporting is determined, a second-
ary fine f2 is imposed.
This secondary fine for misreporting may be implemented either as a fixed-fine 
or as an extended day-fine. A fixed secondary fine would punish all misreporting 
offenders  the same, not taking  into account  their wealth or the magnitude of their 
misreporting.17 Such a fine constrains effective deterrence. First, it under-deters rich 
offenders due to wealth independency. Second, it does not achieve marginal deter-
rence since the fine is not adjusted to the gravity of misreporting.
Therefore, in order to achieve an optimal deterrence, this article offers to impose 
a secondary day-fine. This fine would take the following elements into account. 
First, through the daily unit, the fine would capture the wealth of the offender, hence 
deterring equally high and low-income offenders. Second, by varying the fine based 
on the magnitude of misreporting, this sanction would achieve marginal deterrence. 
Namely, if misreporting behavior would not be entirely deterred, convicted offend-
ers would at least be incentivized to report a closer wealth to the true one. Finally, an 
17 An example of a general fine for misreporting which does not take into account the magnitude of the 
deception may be found in Sect. 6, Chapter 16 of the Criminal Code of Finland: “A person who in order 
to obtain economic benefit provides a public authority, for the purpose of imposing a fine, essentially 
false or misleading information on his or her income, maintenance liability or other circumstance affect-
ing his or her solvency, shall be sentenced for fine deception to a fine or to imprisonment for at most 
three months.”
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extension of the day-fine may be found in the third element. Namely, the secondary 
day-fine would also depend on the severity of the primary fine. This structure would 
assure optimal deterrence of offenders regardless the severity of their primary fine.18
Consequently, a suitable measure for the gravity of the secondary offense would 
account for the magnitude of misreporting (in relation to the total wealth) and the 
severity of the primary fine. Formally speaking the percentage of the total wealth 
that was not reported is multiplied by the number of days that were imposed under 
the primary fine w−w̃
w
× n1 . As a result of this composition, the secondary fine posi-
tively depends on the gravity of misreporting and hence the offender faces the fol-
lowing utility maximization problem when forming his reporting decision.
Under this twofold fine structure the convicted offender is confronted with a 
trade-off between a higher primary and a higher secondary fine. If he decides to 
report his true wealth, the primary fine is higher but the potential secondary fine is 
zero. Conversely, if the offender underreports his wealth, he decreases the primary 
fine but risks a secondary fine, in case his wealth is audited. Because both fines 
depend on the magnitude of his misreporting, a utility maximizing offender chooses 
to report the level of wealth for which the sum of the utility loss is minimal.
The last stage is to determine the relation between the primary and the second-
ary fine. The primary fine is a regular day-fine, which consist of the number of 
days n and the daily unit d(w) . The daily unit is obtained by taking a fraction of the 
offender’s wealth d(w) = 훼 × w . This fraction is fixed in the law in some jurisdic-
tions. Therefore, the primary fine function based on the offender’s reported wealth is 
composed as:
The secondary fine is also implemented as a day-fine that consist of a number of 
days and a daily unit f2 = n2 × d(w) . The number of days for the secondary fine is 
determined by the percentage of misreporting multiplied by the number of days of 
the primary fine and the severity factor, n2(w, w̃) = w−w̃w × n1 × 𝛽 . The severity factor 
(9)max
w̃
[
(
1 − p2
)
v
(
w − f1(w̃)
)
+ p2v
(
w − f1(w) − f2(w, w̃)
)
]
(10)f1(w̃) = n𝛼w̃
18 The following hypothetical example illustrates the need for the correlation between the secondary and 
the primary fine. Offender A was convicted for an aggravated assault, while offender B was convicted 
for minor theft. Both offenders have the same wealth, which is measured as $100 per day. The daily 
unit is set in the law as 50% of the offender’s daily wealth. Offender A receives 50  days of fine, and 
offender B receives 10 days. Both offenders report 90% of their true wealth. In other words, they state 
to the court that their daily wealth amounts to $90. Consequently, the fine imposed on offender A is 
90 × 0.5 × 50 = $2250. While offender B is sentenced to a fine of 90 × 0.5 × 10 = $450. Therefore, offender 
A’s benefit from misreporting is $250, and offender B’s gain is $50. Following their self-reporting, both 
offenders are audited and their under-reporting is discovered. If the maximum secondary fine, which is 
set in the law, is fixed and does not depend on the severity of the primary fine, those two offenders may 
face different incentives. For instance, if the maximum secondary fine is $200, it would deter offender B 
since his expected gain from misreporting with regard to the primary offense is only $50. On the con-
trary, offender A gains $250 from misreporting, thus it is still rational for him to under-report his wealth 
if the expected punishment for it is only $200.
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( 훽 ) states by how much the number of the secondary days of fine is larger than the 
days of the primary fine. Thus, it constitutes the severity of the secondary enforce-
ment system and should be set ex-ante in the law in order to deter misreporting. The 
daily unit remains the same for both fines but is of course corrected according to the 
true wealth after the audit was performed. Therefore, the function for the secondary 
fine is denoted as:
Given these two fine functions the maximization problem for the reported wealth 
choice changes to:
Following up on the previous assumption that the offender cannot report a nega-
tive wealth and given the assumed fine functions, it follows that the offender’s 
reporting choice lies in the interval [0,w].19 A utility maximizing offender will chose 
w̃ such that this utility is optimal. The specific choice of w̃ is given by the optimality 
condition, which is the solution to the offender’s maximization problem.
While seeking to determine the exact value of w̃ is not desirable, it seems worth-
while to better understand how the parameters of the enforcement system influence 
the offender’s reporting choice and what happens to it if they are altered. Figure 1 
illustrates how the offender’s reporting choice changes depending on the severity of 
the secondary enforcement system (represented by the severity factor) for a given 
probability of an audit. If the severity factor increases then the offender chooses 
to report a higher level of wealth. This behavior pattern evolves because with his 
reporting choice the offender has to trade off actual utility loss from the primary fine 
with the expected utility loss from a secondary fine. A higher severity factor implies 
a severer secondary fine and hence the expected utility loss through the secondary 
enforcement increases. If the expected utility loss increases, misreporting becomes 
more costly and hence the offender reacts by reporting a higher wealth in order to 
avoid these potential utility losses. This positive correlation between the severity 
factor and the reported wealth persists until 훽+ . At this point the secondary enforce-
ment system is sufficiently deterring misreporting behavior.
Figure  2 shows how the offender’s reporting-choice changes depending on the 
probability of an audit of his actual wealth, given a constant severity factor. If the 
(11)f2(w, w̃) =
{
n𝛼𝛽(w − w̃), w̃ < w
0, w̃ ≥ w
(12)max
w̃
(
1 − p2
)
v(w − n𝛼w̃) + p2v(w − n𝛼w − n𝛼𝛽(w − w̃))
(13)𝛽 =
1 − p2
p2
v�(w − n𝛼w̃)
v�(w − n𝛼w − n𝛼𝛽(w − w̃))
19 Obviously, the offender will not chose to report more than his actual wealth w̃ > w . This is 
because w̃ ≥ w implies that there is no secondary fine f
2
= 0  and hence v(w − 𝛼w̃) . Given this 
v(w − 𝛼w) > v(w − 𝛼w̃) for ∀w̃ > w holds which implies that reporting the true wealth strictly dominates 
all reporting choices above this level.
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probability of an audit is very low, the expected secondary fine is low, which implies 
that underreporting only causes a low expected utility loss. Hence, the offender 
chooses to report zero wealth since thereby he avoids an actual loss of utility by 
the primary fine. As the probability of an audit increases, the offender’s reported 
wealth also increases. Since an increase in the probability of an audit simultaneously 
increases the expected utility loss from the secondary fine, the offender rebalances 
the two utility losses. This process continues until the point p+ at which the offender 
chooses to report his true wealth because the expected utility losses by the second-
ary fine fully outweigh any utility gains from underreporting.
In order to determine the severity factor, which fully deters underreporting, the 
reported wealth is set to the true (w̃ = w) and then plugged into the optimality condi-
tion, which simplifies to:
This term implies that in order to achieve perfect deterrence of underreporting, 
the severity factor should be equal to the reciprocal of the audit probability, which 
is normalized to zero. This relationship is illustrated in Fig. 3, which shows that for 
audit probabilities below 25% the secondary fine has to be exceedingly severe. This 
requirement becomes more lenient as the probability increases. At an audit probabil-
ity of 100% no secondary fine is necessary anymore. This result reflects the offend-
er’s trade-off between the utility loss by the primary fine and the expected utility 
loss by the secondary fine. Given this relation for full deterrence, it can be inferred 
that the offender always chooses to report his true wealth if:
In conclusion, to prevent underreporting, the severity of the secondary fine must 
account for the probability of an audit in an appropriate manner. Due to the high 
costs of gathering the financial information of the offender, as explained in Sect. 3.1, 
wealth audits in practice can only be performed with a low probability. Conse-
quently, the severity factor has to be sufficiently high in order to deter misreporting. 
This leads to severity of the secondary fine that compensates for the low audit prob-
ability in practice.
4.2  Legal limitations for the severity factor
The results of the previous section indicate that for every positive audit probability there 
exists a severity factor such that the secondary enforcement system is fully deterring. 
Therefore, in theory even a low probability of auditing can be fully deterring, if the 
severity factor is set sufficiently high. Here we use the standard assumption that increas-
ing the size of the fine, unlike increasing probability, is costless. In the context of day 
fines, increasing the number of the imposed days of fine for misreporting is assumed to 
be costless. However, in all criminal justice systems that apply day-fines the maximum 
(14)훽+ ≥
1 − p2
p2
(15)훽 ≥
1 − p2
p2
⇔ p2 ≥
1
1 + 훽
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number of days that can be imposed on the offender are limited by the criminal code. 
In some jurisdictions the maximum number of days can be doubled (e.g. § 1(1), Chap-
ter 2a and § 3(2), Chapter 7 of The Criminal Code of Finland; Sections 40(1) and 54(4) 
of The German Criminal Code) for multiple offenses. Nevertheless, there is always a 
statutory limit of the maximum number of days that can be imposed within a day-fine 
sentence.20 In the context of the secondary enforcement system this limitation on the 
maximum number of days implies that the sum of the number of days from the primary 
fine and the secondary fine must be below this legal cap Nmax ≥ n1 + n2 . As presented 
Fig. 1  Offender’s reporting 
choice as a function of the 
severity factor given a constant 
probability of an audit
Fig. 2  Offender’s reporting 
choice as a function of the 
probability of an audit given a 
constant severity factor
20 The reason for this practice might be to avoid “inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.” See 
for example, Article 3 to the European Convention on Human Rights, and its analysis in the context of 
life imprisonment (European Court of Human Rights, Press Unit, October 2015). Not limiting the num-
ber of day-fines might turn this punishment to a financial life servitude. This is especially unreasonable 
since, unlike with life imprisonment, the most severe crimes are not dealt with fines.
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in the previous sections, the secondary fine is determined by the multiplication of the 
severity factor by the number of days of the primary fine Nmax ≥ n1 + n1 × 훽 . This 
means that, for the existing statutory limit on maximum number of days and a given 
severity factor there exists a threshold point nz for which the sum of days from the pri-
mary and the secondary fine is equal to the statutory limit Nmax = nz × (1 + 훽) . This 
threshold point, therefore, denotes the maximum number of primary-fine-days until 
which the secondary enforcement system is fully deterrent:
Figure 4 illustrates this relationship. Consider points na and nb , which are bel-
low or above the threshold point ( nz ) respectively. If the number of the primary-
fine-days ( na ) is below the threshold point the addition of the secondary-fine-days 
does not exceed the statutory limit. Thus, the secondary enforcement system is 
fully deterrent. On the other hand, if the number of the primary-fine-days ( nb ) is 
above the threshold point, the secondary fine cannot be fully imposed because the 
addition of the secondary-fine-days would exceed the statutory limit.
In order to remain within the lawful boundaries the number of days of the sec-
ondary fine must be reduced. Adjusting the number of days of the secondary fine 
implies that the actual (effective) severity factor will be below the nominal sever-
ity factor, which is the factor that is set in the law in order to fully deter misre-
porting. Therefore, it can be concluded that the actual severity factor depends on 
the number of days of the primary fine:
(16)nz =
Nmax
1 + 훽
(17)𝛽z
(
n1
){= 𝛽 if n1 < nz
< 𝛽 if n1 ≥ nz
Fig. 3  The fully deterring β as a 
function of p
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Consequently, the higher the number of days of the primary fine is, the less 
days are ‘available’ for the secondary fine. Increasing the number of days for the 
primary fine above the threshold point (if n1 ≥ nz ), leads accordingly to a decrease 
of the actual severity factor d𝛽z
dn1
< 0.
A decrease of the actual severity factor below the fully deterring, nominal sever-
ity factor leads to underreporting (see Sect. 4.1). Figure 5 illustrates the underreport-
ing problem for an actual severity factor 훽z that is below the fully deterring level 훽+ . 
An actual severity factor of 훽z will, therefore, cause the offender to underreport his 
wealth at level wz . Generalized, this means that the larger the difference between the 
nominal and the actual severity factor is, the more will the offender underreport his 
wealth dw̃
d𝛽+−𝛽z
< 0.
Underreporting reduces the primary fine, which in turn leads to under-deterrence 
of the primary offenses. Under-deterring the primary offenses increases the overall 
level of crime, which poses costs on the society. An indication of these costs is given 
by function (18), which denotes the extent of forgone deterrence.21 To capture the 
forgone deterrence the function takes the fraction of wealth that is misreported mul-
tiplied by the primary number of days.22
In order to get the extent of the total costs we need to aggregate the individual 
costs of misreporting. For the aggregation, a distribution function D(n) that describes 
the frequency of each specific number of primary day-fine in our legal system is 
required. Multiplying D(n) with Cn(n) gives, hence, the extent of the underreporting 
problem for a given primary fine. The extent of total costs is obtained by taking the 
integral over the range of primary-fine-days from the threshold point to the statutory 
limit on days.
(18)Cn(n) =
w − w̃(n)
w
× n
Fig. 4  a caption of the line that indicates the threshold point
21 These costs include different burdens imposed by crimes, and it also include the forgone revenues due 
to lower fines. Naturally, it does not provide directly the exact costs to society. A measure of such costs 
requires an empirical investigation of the welfare costs of forgone deterrence.
22 The element of number of days in day-fines, i.e. n, reflects the severity of the crime. In theory this 
can serve as a proxy for the costs the crime imposes on the society. Therefore, if we connect the extent 
of misreporting to the number of days, we could say it reflects the changes in the costs imposed on the 
society.
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C훽(훽) states the costs of a certain severity factor in terms of underreporting. The 
function depends on the severity factor because it determines the threshold point, 
which denotes the lower boundary of the integral. For instance, if the severity factor 
훽 increases, the threshold point Nmax
1+훽
 shifts down. This in turn, increases the range of 
the integral. Therefore, the extent of the total costs goes up. Since both D and C are 
always positive, it can be concluded that the costs are increasing in the severity fac-
tor dC𝛽
d𝛽
> 0.
4.3  The optimal combination between the severity factor and the audit 
probability
As explained in the previous section, an increase in the severity factor might increase 
the social costs (hereinafter: ‘the costs of the severity factor’). The audit costs of the 
secondary enforcement system, on the other hand, are the costs of one audit multi-
plied by the total number of audits (see Sect. 3.1). Increasing the audit probability is 
costly forasmuch as it factually means that more audits have to be conducted by the 
law enforcement authorities. This suggests that different types of financial informa-
tion, such as income, assets, obligations, number of dependents, must be collected 
from different authorities. Since each wealth-audit is a separate task and they are 
independent from each other, no economies of scale can be realized while increas-
ing the audit-probability. Having a larger audit department can increase the speed of 
auditing but not its costs given the additional recourses spent on a larger staff. As a 
result, it is assumed that the cost function for the audit probability is linear and that 
the total costs increase by γ for each percentage point increase.
(19)C훽(훽) =
Nmax
∫
n=
Nmax
1+훽
D(n) × Cn(n)
Fig. 5  A caption of the relation 
between the actual severity fac-
tor and the reported wealth
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As discussed in Sect.  4.1, deterrence can be improved both by increasing the 
audit probability as well as by increasing the severity factor. Because of these two 
options, there exists an infinite set combinations of audit probability and severity 
factor, which induces the offenders to truthfully report their wealth. To judge which 
of these combinations is the most socially desirable, both costs of the secondary 
enforcement system have to be taken into account. The optimal combination mini-
mizes the sum of the audit costs and the social costs of the severity factor. Since 
both elements of the secondary enforcement system entail costs, an optimal combi-
nation of a severity factor and a probability of audit can be found by a constrained 
optimization of the total secondary enforcement costs.
Therefore, the optimization problem can be defined as minimizing the total social 
costs while ensuring deterrence of misreporting. The constraint for this minimiza-
tion problem is Eq.  (14), which specifies all fully-deterring combinations of audit 
probability and severity factor. The first derivative of this function shows that the 
severity factor is decreasing in the audit probability d𝛽
dp
< 0 , which means, accord-
ingly, that the severity factor’s contribution to the enforcement costs is decreasing in 
the probability of an audit dC𝛽
d𝛽
< 0 . In other words, the higher the probability of an 
audit is the lower are enforcement costs that are generated by the severity factor. 
This interdependency is intuitive, since the severity factor and the audit probability 
are substitutes and hence an increase in one allows a decrease of the other without 
conflicting the full deterrence constraint. Rewriting the severity factor’s costs as a 
function of the audit probability and plugging in the explicit audit costs function 
leads to the following secondary enforcement costs function:
To find the optimal combination of severity factor and probabilities of audit, the 
first derivate of the modified enforcement costs function is taken. Equalizing the first 
derivate and solving for the probability of an audit leads the following condition for 
minimal secondary enforcement costs.
This equation shows the trade-off between auditing costs and the social costs 
of forgone deterrence. Reducing the probability of an audit, and thereby the audit-
ing costs, requires an increase of the severity factor. Increasing the severity factor 
imposes some social costs since not all primary offenses can be deterred with the 
secondary enforcement system. However, decreasing the audit probability from 
100% requires only a small increase in the severity factor, and thereby a small 
increase of the social costs of forgone deterrence. This means that at a point of cer-
tain auditing probability the marginal cost of auditing are significantly higher than 
(20)Cp(p) = 훾 × p
(21)C(p, 훽) = Cp(p) + C훽(훽)
(22)C(p) = 훾 × p + C훽(p)
(23)−
dC훽
dp
= 훾
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the marginal social cost of the severity factor. The difference in the marginal cost 
declines with every reduction of the auditing probability. Nevertheless, as long as 
marginal costs of auditing are higher that the marginal costs of the severity factor, 
reducing the probability is socially desirable. This is true until the point where the 
two marginal costs are equal, which is the optimal level of auditing. Equation (23) 
specifies this socially optimal combination of the audit probability and the severity 
factor for the secondary enforcement system.
This combination between audit probability and the size of the severity fac-
tor ‘sacrifices’ a certain level of deterrence. However, this is defensible in terms 
of social welfare costs. In a system with scarce resources, not all crimes can be 
deterred. Therefore, as already presented by Becker (1968), policy-makers need to 
choose the level of enforcement that minimizes the total costs of crime to society. 
In the specific case of day-fines, the high costs of auditing justify a certain level of 
forgone deterrence.
5  Concluding remarks
This article is the first to formally analyze possible impediments to an efficient use 
of the day-fine system. Day-fines have a potential to extend the use of pecuniary 
sanctions and to reduce the number of fine-defaulters. This fine considers not only 
the severity of the sanction, but also the financial state of the offender. Hence, it 
imposes an equal relative burden of punishment on all offenders committing similar 
crimes, regardless of their wealth. Nevertheless, this system faces significant obsta-
cles to efficiency. One of these hurdles is the cost of collecting the required financial 
information. The data on the wealth of the offender is essential to set the proper fine. 
However, the offender, who has no incentives to reveal it, possesses this informa-
tion. The enforcement authorities are able in theory to acquire this information, yet 
in a costly manner.
The novelty of this article is in offering a secondary day-fine, which depends on 
multiple factors, in order to induce truthful self-reporting of one’s wealth. This sec-
ondary fine considers the wealth of the offender, the level of his misreporting and 
the gravity of the primary fine. Such system allows for the tailoring of the fine to 
each particular case, thus increasing individual and general deterrence. Furthermore, 
a model developed in this article enables to determine an optimal severity factor that 
minimizes the social costs of the secondary enforcement system.
To date, half of the EU member states and a few American States apply the 
model of day-fines. Therefore, the suggested secondary enforcement system has a 
high societal relevance. Furthermore, it can be expected that solving the asymmet-
ric information problem and decreasing the costs of information would attract more 
jurisdictions to apply this fine.
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